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Using 42,808 firm-year observations from 32 countries around the world, we investigate 
whether cross-listing in the US is associated with better accounting quality, and whether 
investor protection moderates the effect of cross-listing on accounting quality. Our main results 
show firms that are cross-listed in the US exhibit more timely reporting of losses, greater 
tendency to manage earnings downward, and more value relevance of accounting numbers as 
compared to their domestic counterparts. Cross-listed firms originating from high investor 
protection jurisdictions, particularly in high anti-director rights and common law countries, 
exhibit greater tendency to recognise a more timely reporting of losses and to manage earnings 
downward but exhibit lower value relevance of earnings as compared to cross-listed firms 
domiciled in low anti-director rights and non-common law countries. These results suggest that 
the strength of investor protection in home country plays an important role in determining the 
quality of accounting numbers of cross-listed firms. 
 














1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The financial globalization literature highlights that cross-listed firms would benefit in terms 
of increasing visibility, broadening the shareholder base, gaining access to financial markets, 
improving relations with the foreign financial community, and increasing demand for the firm's 
stock (e.g., Siegel, 2005; He, 2008). Decision of foreign firms to list their shares particularly 
in the US securities markets (cross-listing hereafter) is driven by the quest for greater access to 
cheaper capital for funding growth opportunities (Hail and Leuz, 2009). This is due to the fact 
that cross-listed firms are subjected to the rigorous US Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) requirements including various aspects of corporate governance. However, cross-listing 
results in an implicit contract between corporate governance of the firm’s home and host 
environments and raises questions on how much diffusion takes place between these two 
(Bauer et al., 2004). Evidence of accounting scandals (e.g., Tingting, 2014) brings into question 
the governance aspects of the cross-listed firms. In particular, despite having strong 
fundamental characteristics of being listed in the US stock exchanges, unethical issues of the 
cross-listed firms trigger concerns regarding their accounting quality. Hence, the aim of this 
paper is to examine whether cross-listing benefits in terms of enhancing accounting quality, 
and whether the strength of investor protection explains the variations in the accounting quality 
of firms cross-listed in the US stock market.  
 
Thus far, the effect of cross-listing on accounting quality is still debatable as the proponent of 
the bonding hypothesis asserts that cross-listed firms rent the host market’s superior corporate 
governance system (Licht, 2003) but critics argue that these firms actually face few regulatory 
and disclosure requirements due to weak enforcement (Frost and Pownall, 1994). Further, 
accounting quality is also influenced by a set of interrelated home country-level factors (Isidro 
et al., 2016).  For example, the accounting quality varies for firms domiciled in different levels 
of investor protection (Houqe et al., 2012). Hence, when institutional factors are considered, 
the home-country governance could either complement or supplement the effect of cross-listing 
in the US on accounting quality. The question that arises is whether home-country governance 
continues to influence the accounting quality of firms that are cross-listed in the US, despite 






In doing so, we conduct empirical analyses on 42,808 firm-year observations from 32 
countries, covering data for a period from 2007 to 2016. Our main results show that firms cross-
listed in the US demonstrate better accounting quality than their domestic counterparts, i.e., by 
exhibiting more timely reporting of losses, greater tendency to manage earnings downward, 
and higher value relevance of accounting numbers. Further analysis shows that cross-listed 
firms in the high investor protection jurisdictions exhibit more timely reporting of losses and 
manage earnings downward but lower value relevance of earnings as compared to cross-listed 
firms domiciled in the weak investor protection countries. This evidence suggests that the 
strength of investor protection of the home country plays important roles in influencing the 
accounting quality of cross-listed firms. Our results are robust even after considering (i) 
alternative measures of accounting quality and investor protection; (ii) the impact of the 2008-
2011 global crisis and the passage of the Rule 12h-6 that ease the requirements for deregistering 
from the US; (iii) firms audited by the Big 4; (iv) the exclusion of UK and Japanese firms in 
the analysis; and (v) selection bias issues.  
  
This study makes three incremental contributions to the extant accounting literature: First, it 
sheds light on how the relationship between cross-listing and accounting quality depend not 
only on institutional factors of the host countries but also the home countries. In doing so, we 
incorporate the effect of home countries’ in analysing the degree of accounting quality of cross-
listed firms. Thus, we extend prior works by Lang et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2006) by 
documenting that such association is also influenced by the strength of investor protection of 
home-country institutional factors. Further, we address the issue of sample selection bias 
highlighted by Leuz (2006) by comparing foreign firms that cross-list in the US to their 
domestic counterparts. Our study extends international accounting literature, (e.g., Cahan et 
al., 2009), by showing evidence on the moderating effect of investor protection on accounting 
quality. Second, unlike prior studies which mostly focus only on ‘legal bonding’, the evidence 
documented in this study use both bonding and signalling theories in explaining the motivations 
underlying cross listing. More to the point, we show that cross-listed firms benefited not only 
from renting the superior corporate governance system of the US, but also through the 
improvement in their information environment arising from cross-listing.  Third, as compared 
to the cross-listing and accounting quality literature that often focus only on the host-country 





factors in curbing the manipulation of accounting numbers. More specifically, we provide 
evidence related to the institutional theory by considering that cross-listed firms also face 
incentives from the various institutional factors of the home country.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature review and develops 
testable hypotheses, section 3 discusses the research design and sample selection, section 4 
presents empirical results, and finally, section 5 provides a summary and implications of the 
study. 
 
2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
A proponent of the bonding hypothesis asserts that firms cross-list to rent the host market’s 
superior corporate governance system (Licht, 2003) as they commit themselves to the stricter 
enforcement and litigation environment of the host market (Lang et al., 2006; Eng et al., 2008). 
Cross-listing makes it harder and more costly for controlling owners and managers to extract 
private control benefits and to expropriate outside investors (Stulz, 1999). Ghosh and He (2015) 
indicate that cross-listing improves investor protection, reduces agency problems, and induces 
better investment decisions by managers which collectively, result in higher value for firms. 
The bonding hypothesis is supported by studies that examine capital market benefits of cross-
listing in the context of capital raising (Chinn and Ito, 2006), analyst following (Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008), corporate valuation (Ghosh and He, 2015) and cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 
2009). Nevertheless, that the actual ‘legal bonding’ benefits of cross-listing may be overstated 
(Siegel, 2005) as there are weak enforcement mechanisms in place when foreign firms are 
involved (Frost and Pownall, 1994).  
 
Accordingly, there is anecdotal evidence that listing effects are exchange-specific (Eng et al., 
2008) and that being cross-listed does not necessarily convey the impression of good news 
about a firm (Durand et al., 2006). In particular, the benefits of cross-listing are dedicated to 
the improvement in information environment of the cross-listed firms. For example, the 
information environment of firms cross-listed in the US is deemed to improve through the 
attention given by financial analysts and monitoring by sophisticated US capital market 
participants, all of which are facilitated by the regulatory requirement for a reconciliation of 





listing creates better information environment surrounding the firms, it should convey useful 
information about their accounting quality. In line with this argument, Lang et al. (2003) find 
that firms cross-listed in the US exhibit better accounting quality relative to foreign firms that 
are not. However, comparison between cross-listed firms in the US, and US firms themselves 
suggest that the cross-listed firms show more tendency to manage earnings, relative to the US 
firms (Lang et al., 2006). Findings of Lang et al. (2006) are consistent with the view that the 
underlying incentives and regulatory environments may differ between the cross-listed and US 
firms.1 While the cross-listed firms are required to comply with similar requirements as the US 
firms, they are also influenced by different reporting incentives originating from the 
institutional arrangements and market forces in their home countries.  
 
Against this backdrop, revisiting whether cross-listing in the US affects accounting quality is 
warranted for several reasons. First, this study attempts to resolve the dilemma on the extent to 
which the US environment influences the benefits of cross-listing, given the cross-listed firms 
are also subjected by the institutional environment of their home countries. Bauer et al. (2004) 
suggest that it is uncertain on how much diffusion takes place between corporate governance 
of the cross-listed firm’s home and host environments. In doing so, we extend and follow the 
recommendation of Leuz et al. (2006) by using both firms that cross-list in the US and firms 
that do not cross-list that are only subjected to their home countries’ institutional environment. 
Second, this study examines whether cross-listing can truly signal to investors the quality of 
the firms’ financial reporting. Despite various worldwide efforts to strengthen corporate ethical 
conducts, issues of accounting scandals are still escalating including those involving cross-
listed firms in the US that are supposed to be subjected to the rigorous regulations of the US.2 
In incorporating various aspects of accounting quality of firms from various countries, we 
follow Lang et al. (2006) by employing a wide range of proxies for accounting quality. 
                                                          
1 Ball et al. (2000) provide example involving non-US firms that operate in environments where stakehoolders 
such as labor and banks represent the composition of their corporate boards. On one hand, the stakeholders 
typically do not share as much in the upside, and face risk on the downside, and accordingly may provide 
incentives for management to report earnings with lower variance. On the other hand, reporting high profits is 
likely to attract political costs and greater demands from governments and labor, while large losses may increase 
the probability of intervention to ensure the viability of the firm. As a result, smoothing creates opacity to avoid 
firms from being scrutinized by outsiders and facilitate wealth expropriation by insiders (Leuz et al., 2003).  
2 Data from NYSE in the years 2011 and 2012 serves as evidence of the scenarios where unethical conducts, such 
as misrepresentations in financial reporting and falsification of the underlying documents on which audits relied, 
have caused more than 100 Chinese companies delisted or suspended from trading on the NYSE (Cogman and 






We posit that cross-listing in the US is associated with higher accounting quality. As rigorous 
regulations of the US strengthen their governance, cross-listed firms can be expected to have 
better accounting quality than the non-cross-listed. However, in the context where the 
enforcement aspects of the US regulation towards the cross-listed firms are weak, and the 
possibility that home-country institutional environment structures the governance of the cross-
listed firms, their accounting quality may not be different than firms that are not cross-listed. 
Based on the above arguments, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H1 Cross-listing in the US stock market is positively associated to accounting 
quality.  
 
Drawing on the institutional theory, various aspects of the institutional environments including 
cultural norms, social knowledge, rules and regulations influence organizations and 
organizational behaviour. Institutional environments of each country create incentives that 
influence the behaviour of corporate executives, investors, regulators, and other market 
participants (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). The variations related to institutional environment 
can be derived from two stream of extant studies: First, home countries’ institutional factors 
influence cross-listing decisions and  in particular, Chen et al. (2015) show that mandatory 
IFRS adoption in the home countries increases the propensity of firms’ cross-listing activities 
especially in countries with larger and more liquid capital markets. He (2008) finds that the 
listings of Levels II and III American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in US stock exchanges have 
dropped significantly in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period, with the drop being more 
evident for firms from countries with a lower level of shareholder protection. These results 
suggest that rigorous regulation of the host countries could have a different regulatory burden 
for firms in different institutional environments. Second, home countries’ institutional factors 
determine the quality of financial reporting. Prior studies on investor protection rights show 
variations in earnings quality across countries (e.g., DeFond et al., 2007; Francis and Wang, 
2008) and suggest that managers’ incentives for opportunistic behaviour decreases with the 
level of investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003). Houqe et al. (2012) find that the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings quality increases for firms in countries with strong 





protection on the quality of accounting information and the possibility that institutional 
environment of the countries influence the characteristics of reported accounting data. Thus, 
while renting the host countries’ superior corporate governance system may benefit the cross-
listed firms, the extent to which they would benefit is also determined by the institutional 
factors of their home countries.  
  
In the context of firms that cross-list in the US, the determination of the prevailing institutional 
environment is an issue since cross-listing results in an implicit contract between corporate 
governance of the firm’s home and host environments (Bauer et al., 2004). Prior empirical 
evidence involving the accounting quality of cross-listed firms are in support of the need to 
consider whether their managerial incentive is influenced by the institutional environments of 
the US or the home-country. He et al. (2008) compare conservative accounting behavior of 
ADRs in the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods. They find that only Levels II and III ADRs 
from code law countries become more conservative, whereas Levels II and III ADRs from 
common law countries exhibit no significant change in accounting conservatism. Lang et al. 
(2006) argue that greater earnings management found in cross-listed firms could be due to the 
fact that the SEC regulation does not supplement the effect of weak local environment on 
foreign firms. Accordingly, the results indicate that there is a joint-effect of both cross-listing 
in the US and the strength of investor protection of the home country on accounting quality.  
 
We posit that the strength of investor protection of the home country explains the variations in 
the accounting quality of firms cross-listed in the US. On the one hand, accounting quality of 
cross-listed firms in strong investor protection countries would be different than in weak 
investor protection countries as home-country environment jointly-affect accounting quality. 
In this complementary effect perspective, accounting quality for the cross-listed firms is better 
than the non-cross listed firms only in strong investor protection countries but not in weak 
investor protection countries. In the institutional setting of the home-country that increases 
incentives for firms to engage in manipulating behaviour, the benefit of strong enforcement 
and litigation environment of the US on accounting quality can be exacerbated. When home 
country’s investor protection itself is weak, it would be difficult and costly for the US regulators 
to impose legal actions towards the cross-listed firms that do not abide to the SEC’s regulation. 





opportunistic reporting, accounting quality for cross-listed firms in weak institutional 
environment would not be different than other firms that are not cross-listed. On the other hand, 
there would be no differences in the accounting quality of cross-listed firms in strong investor 
protection countries and in weak investor protection countries. In this substitutive effect 
perspective, the strength of investor protection is not expected to influence the effect of cross-
listing on accounting quality. The pressure to meet stringent requirement of listing in the US 
market would already curb the managerial opportunistic behaviour among cross-listed firms in 
weak investor protection countries, thereby improving their accounting quality as well, similar 
to those from the strong investor protection countries. Hence, the hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
H2  The positive association between cross-listing in the US stock market and 
accounting quality is greater for firms from strong investor protection 
countries than weak investor protection countries. 
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Our sample covers firms domiciled in 32 countries for the period 2007–2016. We collect the 
cross listing and the financial information from the Osiris-Bureau van Dijk database while data 
on investor protection and legal system are sourced from Djankov et al. (2008) and La Porta et 
al. (1998), respectively. The list of all variables, the definition and data sources are reported in 
Table 1. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
We exclude (i) financial institutions (SIC code between 6000 and 6999), similar to the approach 
used by prior research (e.g. Francis and Wang, 2008; Houqe et al., 2012); (ii) utility companies 
(SIC code between 4900 and 4999) because they are highly regulated; (iii) observations from 
countries with less than 100 observations i.e., Colombia, Czech Republic, and Ecuador; and 
(iv) observations from countries with no firms cross-list in the US market (e.g., Chile, Egypt, 
Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Turkey).3 We also exclude 
                                                          
3 China and South Korea were excluded from our sample as we encountered problem matching the cross-list firms 





observations with any missing or incomplete data, and winsorized observations that fell in the 
top and bottom 1% to mitigate the influence of outliers. Our final sample consists of 42,808 
firm-year observations. The sample selection process is summarised in Table 2. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Following prior literature (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2003, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003), 
we use three dimensions of accounting quality: (i) timely loss recognition, (ii) earnings 
management; and (iii) value relevance.  
 
3.1. Timely loss recognition 
 
Timely loss recognition, or conservatism, is defined as the extent to which current period 
accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses relative to economic gain 
(Basu, 1997). Prior studies (e.g., Ball et al., 2000, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Bushman 
and Piotroski, 2006; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007)) found a timelier reporting of bad news 
relative to that of good news. To test whether cross-listing in the US market leads to more 
timely loss recognition, and whether investor protections influence this relationship, we 
employed the Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings model. 
 
In the Basu’s (1997) model, stock return is used as a proxy for economic income as it is 
assumed that stock prices reflect all information from various sources other than the financial 
statements, consistent with evidence that stock prices lead earnings information (Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Kothari and Sloan, 1992). To examine whether cross-listing in the US market 
leads to more timely loss recognition, we modified the Basu's (1997) reverse regression model 
by incorporating a dummy variable for cross-listing (CROSS) and interacting this variable with 
the existing test variables in the Basu’s model, as shown below:4 
 
                                                          
4 In equation (1), timely loss recognition is measured by β3, the coefficient on RET*RD, where positive coefficient 
implies that earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. The modified Basu (1997) specification 
allows us to assess whether variations exist in the levels of accounting conservatism between firms that cross-list 
in the US market and their domestic counterparts. The coefficient of RET*RD*CROSS, β7, represents the change 
in the return response coefficient of the firms that cross-list in the US market. In relation to hypothesis 1, the 
coefficient of β7 that is greater than zero indicates that firms that are cross-listed in the US market recognize losses 





EYit = β0 + β1RETit + β2RDit + β3RETit*RDit + β4CROSSit + β5RET*CROSSit  
+ β6RD*CROSSit + β7RET*RD*CROSSit + ψ1-nCountry_Effectsit  
+ θ1-nYear_Effects + εit  
(1) 
 
where EYit is the earnings yield, measured by earnings per share deflated by beginning of the 
fiscal year’s price per share; RETit is the annual return during the fiscal year; RDit is a dummy 
variable equals to one if RETit is negative, and zero otherwise; CROSS is a dummy variable 
equals to one if a firm is cross-listed in the US stock market, and zero otherwise. Finally, we 
include country- and year-fixed effects to control for the potential effects of these variables. 
 
 
3.2. Earnings management 
 
Earnings management is proxied by absolute value of abnormal accruals in which a higher 
value indicates a greater likelihood that firms engage in earnings management and thus, lower 
earnings quality. In our study, abnormal accruals are the value of residuals generated by 
estimating Jones (1991)’s model by industry and year. The estimated sample includes 
companies in 48 industry groups based on Fama and French (1997) industry classification, with 
at least 20 observations in each group. We calculate the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ABSDACC) which captures the combined effects of income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management decisions (Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995; Myers, Myers and 
Omer, 2003. Following Hribar & Nichols (2007), we use the ABSDACC as the dependent 
variable in equation (2) below:  
 
ABSDACC= α0 + β1CROSSit + β2AGEit + β3BIG4it + β4SIZEit + β5FMGROWit  
+ β6INDGROWit + β7LEVit+ β8CFOit+ β9CAPINTit+ β10ININTit 




Equation (2) incorporates a set of firm-level controls: AGE is to control for the difference in 
discretionary accruals of firms with different life cycles (Anthony and Ramesh, 1992); BIG4 is 
to account for the effect of Big4 auditors on discretionary accruals; SIZE is to control for the 
differences in the accruals behaviour of managers of large and small firms (Van Tendeloo and 





specific growth in sales, to capture the possible difference in the accruals behaviour between 
firms with high and low growth that is unrelated to earnings management (Gul et al., 2009); 
INDGROW is an industry growth, which is calculated based on Fama and French’s (1997) 
industry groups, that may cause firms to report systematically different levels of accruals 
(Myers et al., 2003); LEV is to control for the impact of firm leverage (LEV) given that highly 
leveraged firms attempt to avoid debt covenant violations by managing earnings upwards (Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstrelen, 2005); CFO is to capture the negative association between accruals 
and cash flows (Dechow, 1994); CAPINT is to control the potential influence of capital 
intensity on firm’s accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004); and ININT is to 
account for the intensity of intangible asset (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). 
Other variables are as previously defined.  
 
3.3. Value relevance  
 
Value relevance portrays how useful the accounting numbers are to equity investors. That is, 
accounting numbers are considered as value relevant if they have a predicted association with 
stock prices, in line with the argument that the accounting numbers are relevant and reliable to 
investors. In the main analysis, we estimate value relevance using the price model (Barth et al., 
1998). We extend the value relevance analysis by assessing the relationship between cross-
listing and value-relevant, and how investor protections moderate this relationship. The 
modified form of the regression model is as follows:5 
 
PRICEit = α0 + β1BVit + β2E + β3CROSSit + β4BV*CROSSit + β5E*CROSSit  
+ ψ1-nCountry_Effectsit + θ1-nYear_effects + εit 
(3) 
 
where PRICE is the closing stock price of firm; BV is the book value of equity per share; E is 
earnings per share; and other variables are as previously defined.  
 
3.4. Investor protection 
 
                                                          
5 In equation (2), we interpret positive coefficients for book value of equity and earnings (β4 and β5) as evidence 
of value relevance, and positive and significant coefficients on BV*CROSS and E*CROSS (β4 and β5) exhibit 
that cross-listed firms in the US market have greater value relevance of book value of equity and earnings as 
compared to non-cross-listed firms. In equation (3), a higher earnings-return relationship, signified by the 
coefficient of B1, as evidence of higher value relevance, while the coefficient of the interaction variable E*CROSS 
tests whether cross-listed firms are linked to higher value relevance compared to non-cross-listed firms. If 





We employ two measures of investor protection: The first measure is based on the countries’ 
legal system and origin. Following La Porta et al. (1998) and He (2008), we classify common 
law countries as countries with strong investor protection and civil law countries as countries 
with weak investor protection. In the regression models, we incorporate a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one for common law countries, and zero for the civil law countries. The second 
measure is based on the anti-director rights index, which measures the strength of the legal 
system in protecting minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the 
corporate decision-making process (La Porta et al., 1998).6 In this study, we use the anti-
directors index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and modified by Djankov et al. (2008) 
where the total score of the revised index ranges from 0 to 5. We use a dummy variable HIADRI 
where value one is assigned for high investor protection countries if the index is four or higher, 




4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all the variables for the two group of samples, 
i.e., firms cross-listed in the US market and firms that do not cross-list. Sample of cross-listed 
firms shows higher stock prices (PRICE), stock returns (RET), book value of equity (BV), firm 
size (SIZE), earnings per share (E), earnings yield (EY), firm growth (FMGROW), average 
industry growth (INDGROW), and operating cash flow (CFO) than non-cross listed firms. 
However, compared to firms that do not cross-list, sample of firms that are cross-listed in the 
US market has higher debt to assets ratio (DA), lower natural logarithm of age (AGE), and 
mostly audited by BIG4 audit firms. We find no significant differences of capital intensity 
(CAPINT) and intangible intensity (ININT) between both samples. Further, sample of firms 
cross-listed to US market has higher absolute value for discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) but 
lower value of unadjusted discretionary accruals (DAC) compared to firms that do not cross-
listed, exhibiting higher earnings management in particularly earnings downward in cross-
listing sample. Panel B of Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics by countries for cross-listing 
firms (CROSS), anti-director rights’ index (ANTIDIR), dummy variable for high investor 
                                                          
6 The La Porta et al. (1998)’s anti-director rights index comprises six components namely voting by mail, voting 
without blocking of shares, calling an extraordinary general meeting, proportional board representation, pre-





protection countries (HIADRI) and types of legal system. We also present the statistics for 
other country level variables namely the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita 
(GDP), disclosure index (DISC), accounting standards (IFRS), and ownership concentration 
(OWN).  
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
We perform pair-wise correlation analysis among the dependent and independent variables. 
The untabulated results, for brevity purpose, reveal that CROSS is positively correlated with 
book value of equity, earnings per share, stock returns, SIZE, LEV, GROWTH, BIG4, CFO, 
and ININT. We find CROSS is negatively associated with AGE. Although the results show 
several significant correlations between independent variables, none represent any concern for 
multicollinearity.7  
 
4.2. Main empirical results 
 
Table 4 presents the results for timely loss recognition, regressed separately for different 
subsamples. Models (1), (4) and (5) show that the coefficients for RET*RD*CROSS are 
positively significant indicating evidence of incremental timely loss recognition in cross-listed 
firms compared to non-cross-listed firms in high investor protection environment, particularly 
with high anti-director rights and common law legal system, and the full sample. For low 
investor protection samples, as reported in Models (2) and (3), there is no evidence that cross-
listing leads to more timely reporting of losses in low anti-director rights and civil law legal 
system. These results suggest that the impact of cross-listing on earnings conservatism is 
influenced by the level of anti-director rights and the type of legal systems. For additional tests, 
we limit our analyses to cross-listed firms and incorporate dummy variables HIADRI and 
COMLAW and the interaction variables in Models (6) and (7). The results show that the 
coefficients for RET*RD*HIADRI and RET*RD*COMLAW are positively significant, 
indicating evidence of incremental timely loss recognition for cross-listed firms in high 
investor protection countries than in low investor protection countries. In sum, strong investor 
protection in home country and exposure to a more stringent regulation in the US markets 
                                                          
7 Multicollinearity is likely to be a concern when pair-wise correlation between the two variables exceeds 0.80 





provide greater incentives for managers to report more conservative earnings, i.e. timelier loss 
recognition, consistent with prior evidence that managers’ incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour decrease with the level of investor protection (Leuz et al., 2003).  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results in relation to the effect of cross-listing on absolute value 
of discretionary accruals for various subsamples. The coefficients for CROSS in Models (1) to 
(5) are positive and statistically significant indicating that cross-listed firms exhibit greater 
tendency to manage earnings as compared to their domestic counterparts in both low and high 
investors protection countries. The results in Models (6) and (7), where the sample is restricted 
to cross-listed firms, show that the coefficients for HIADRI and COMLAW are statistically 
significant suggesting that cross-listed firms in high investor protection countries show lower 




(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the effect of cross-listing on the value relevance of 
accounting numbers, under different subsamples of investor protection. The results in all 
models are consistent with results of prior studies, where we find strong evidence of value 
relevance of book value of equity and earnings across firms in different subsamples.8 The 
results in Models (1) to (5) show significantly positive coefficients for BV*CROSS and 
E*CROSS implying that higher value relevance of accounting numbers, for both book value 
of equity and earnings, in cross-listed firms compared to non-cross-listed firms, regardless of 
the level of anti-directors rights and types of legal system.9 The results, however, show that the 
                                                          
8 The coefficients on book value of equity (β1) and earnings (β2) are positive and significant in all samples, 
implying that accounting numbers are important for investors. The results indicate that the coefficients of CROSS 
(β3), which capture the effect of cross-listing on stock prices, are positive and significant in Models (1) to (5) 
showing that firms cross-listed in US market exhibit higher stock prices than their domestic counterparts, 
consistent with the findings of Sami and Zhou (2008).  
9 It is important to note that the firms in high investor protections samples have higher coefficient of BV*CROSS 
than the firms in low investor protections samples, for both measures of investor protections i.e. anti-directors 





coefficients for E*CROSS is higher in low anti-directors rights and weak legal system 
environment compared to high anti-directors rights and strong legal system. In Models (6) and 
(7), where the sample is limited to cross-listed firms, the coefficients for BV*HIADRI and 
BV*COMLAW are insignificant, indicating that no differences in the value relevance of book 
value of equity among cross-listed firm in high or low investor protection countries. In contrast, 
the coefficients for E*HIADRI and E*COMLAW are significantly negative, suggesting that 
the value relevance of earnings in cross-listed firm is higher in low investor protection countries 
than in high investor protection countries.  
 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
The results implies that in low investor protection environments, cross-listing has greater 
positive impact on the value relevance of earnings, compared to high investor protection 
environments. The plausible explanation is a high investor protection environment is associated 
with higher earnings quality (Francis and Wang, 2008; DeFond et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2009), 
and the decision to cross-list would marginally enhance the quality of accounting information 
since the difference in security laws and investor protections between the US and high investor 
protection countries are minimal, compared to low investor protection environments where the 
gap is greater. 
 
In summary, the results in Tables 4 to 6 suggest that investor protection plays an important role 
in determining the quality of accounting numbers. However, such effects vary across different 
proxies of accounting quality. Strong investor protection in home country and exposure to a 
more stringent regulation in the US markets contributes to a more conservative reported 
earnings, showed by timelier loss recognition and tendency to manage earnings downward. In 
the value relevance context, stock prices and stock return exhibit stronger link with earnings in 
low investor protection countries compared to high investor protection countries. Consistent 
with prior studies that argued that a high investor protection environment is associated with 
higher earnings quality (Francis and Wang, 2008; DeFond et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2009), our 
study implies that the decision to cross-list would marginally enhance the quality of accounting 





high investor protection countries are minimal, compared to low investor protection 
environment where the gap is much greater. 
 
 
4.3. Endogeneity issue  
 
In our main analysis, we assume that the investor protection variable is an exogenous variable. 
If, on the other hand, investor protection and accounting quality are simultaneously determined, 
our results suffer from an endogeneity bias. To mitigate for endogeneity, we employ a two-
stage estimation procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) to correct for the selection bias. In 
the first stage, we employed a Probit regression on a dummy variable for investor protection. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model in the first stage equation: 
 
HIADRI = α0 + β1GDP + β2DISC + β3IFRS + β4OWN + εit  (4) 
 
where HIADRI is a dummy variable that takes value one for the countries if the revised index 
(ANTIDIR) is four or higher, otherwise zero; GDP is the natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product per capita in US Dollar; DISC is a disclosure index as reported in La Porta et al. (2006); 
IFRS is a dummy variable that takes value one if the financial statements are prepared using 
IFRS standards, otherwise zero; and OWN is an ownership concentration as reported in La 
Porta et al. (2006). 
 
The model includes countries’ GDP per capita since an effective legal infrastructure is costly 
to create and maintain, and hence a country’s wealth potentially influences the level of legal 
enforcement and investor protection. We also include disclosure index (DISC) and ownership 
concentration (OWN) because these variables exert significant influence on investor protection 
(La Porta et al., 2006). The accounting standards are also argued to be related to investor 
protection (Houqe et al., 2012). The results for the first stage estimations are presented in model 
(1) Table 7.10 
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
                                                          
10 In the initial model, we include countries’ legal system which is considered as predetermined and exogenous 
because the origins of most legal systems are several centuries old and many countries inherited their legal system 
through occupation and colonization (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003). However, the legal system is later 






The results show that HIADRI is positively associated with DISC suggesting that countries 
with a high level of investor protection exhibit a high degree of disclosure. We also found that 
GDP, IFRS and OWN have significant negative association suggesting that countries with high 
GDP per capita, IFRS accounting standards and high ownership concentration have poor 
investor protection. We then calculate the Inverse Mills (IMR) ratio by dividing the ratio of the 
probability density function with the cumulative distribution function. In the second stage, we 
incorporate IMR as an additional explanatory variable in Models (2) to (4) to examine whether 
there is difference on the association between investor protection and accounting quality 
proxies on sample restricted to cross-listed firms.  
 
In Model (2), the coefficient for RET*RD*HIADRI is positive and significant, indicating 
evidence of incremental timely loss recognition for cross-listed firms in high investor 
protection countries than in low investor protection countries. We also find the coefficient for 
HIADRI in Model (3) is negative and significant suggesting than cross-listed firms in high 
investor protection countries have lower tendency to manage earnings compared to cross-listed 
firms in low investor protection countries. Finally, the results in Model (4) show that the 
coefficients for BV*HIADRI is positive and significant while the coefficient for E*HIADRI is 
negative and significant, suggesting higher value relevance of book value of equity and lower 
value relevance of earnings in high investor protection countries compared to low investor 
protection countries. In addition, we find the coefficients for IMR are insignificant in Models 
(2)-(4), hence eliminating concern on self-selection issues. Overall, the regression results are 
qualitatively similar to those in the main analysis. 
 
 
4.4. Robustness tests 
 
We perform a battery of tests to ensure our findings are robust to various specifications. First, 
we employ alternative measurements for accounting quality where we use the Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2005) accruals-based test of loss recognition for timely loss recognition, while 
for value relevance we use the return-earnings model by Easton and Harris (1991). The 
untabulated results show significant increase in the timely reporting of losses in cross-listed 





with the main results. We also find qualitatively similar findings where cross-listing only 
enhances the value relevance of earnings in low investor protection sample. For earnings 
management, we use the unadjusted value of discretionary accruals which identifies direction 
of either downward or upward adjustment of reported earnings occurred.11 Compared to non-
cross-listed firms, we find cross-listed firms in full sample, high anti-director rights sample and 
both types of legal system pursue earnings decreasing strategy, suggesting that strong investor 
protection leads to managing earnings downward.  
 
Second, our study control for the impact of the 2008-2011 global financial crisis which is also 
the period associated with the passage of Rule 12h-6 that significantly ease the requirements 
for deregistering from US exchanges (Ghosh and He, 2015). The Rule 12h-6, which enables 
firms to escape the US market’s stringent regulatory and legal environment, weakened the 
bonding benefits of cross-listing (Fernandes et al., 2010; Doidge et al., 2010). Ghosh and He 
(2015) assert that the financial crisis and the passage of Rule 12h-6 had a material impact on 
both cross-listed firms’ investment behavior and the consequent changes in firm value. In 
assessing whether our results hold to these possibilities, we repeated the regression analyses by 
excluding data during the global financial crisis period. The untabulated results show that the 
findings associated with all the three accounting quality proxies remain qualitatively similar.  
 
Third, we examine whether our results were driven by auditor quality. Our concern was 
whether higher accounting quality in cross-listed firms were driven by their high tendency of 
selecting Big 4 auditors compared to the non-cross-listed. Wang and Xin (2011) find that cross-
listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience 
larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors, suggesting 
that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms. 
We regress the equation by limiting our sample to firms audited by Big 4 auditors. The 
untabulated regression estimates on the reduced sample (32,218 firm-year observations) 
produced qualitatively similar results to those reported earlier, except for the second measure 
of conservatism that is based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005), where we find no evidence of 
                                                          
11 The upward adjustment, or earnings overstatement, is more frequent and of greater concern to auditors, as it is 
likely to be associated with opportunistic earnings management (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 2003). The downward 
adjustment, reflected through the use of negative discretionary accruals, is considered as a form of conservative 





differences in the extent of conservatism between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in 
high investor protection sample. In sum, the results show evidence that support our earlier 
findings.  
 
Fourth, the UK was argued as one of the stronger shareholder protection systems in the world. 
Following Ghosh and He (2015) and Goto, Watanabe, and Xu (2009), we exclude UK firms 
from our analysis to estimate whether our result in the strong investor protection sample was 
heavily influenced by the UK. We also tested whether our results were sensitive to the inclusion 
of Japan with an extremely large number of observations (N=10,439) which constitutes almost 
25 percent of the total sample. In our untabulated results, both analyses yield similar findings, 
showing robust evidence on the positive impact of cross-listing on timely loss recognition, 
earnings downward attributes and value relevance, compared to non-cross-listed firms. These 
results are also influenced by the extent of investor protection as cross-listed firms in high 
investor protection sample report more timely loss recognition, higher tendency for earnings 
downward, and lower value relevance compared to non-cross-listed firms. 
 
Fifth, although legal system and anti-directors right index are mostly used in prior studies, they 
are subjected to the assumption that the classifications have not changed over time. To 
overcome this issue, we employ two alternative measures for investor protection, i.e., (i) the 
anti-self-dealing index by Djankov et al. (2008) and (ii) the WEF’s index for investor 
protection. The former measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against self-
dealing by the controlling shareholder (ASDI), while the latter combines the extent of 
disclosure index, the extent of director liability index, and the ease of shareholder suit index 
(IPWEF).12 The findings for ASDI for all models hold, showing robust evidence that cross-
listed firms in high investor protection sample report more timely loss recognition, have higher 
tendency for managing earnings downward, and lower value relevance compared to cross-
listed firms in low investor protection countries. The results for IPWEF show similar findings 
                                                          
12 ASDI focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation that govern a 
specific self-dealing transaction, developed with the help from Lex Mundi law firms and calculated based on the 
average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing. We established dummy variables for DUMASDI 
and DUMIPWEF, where we assign value one if the value higher than median, otherwise zero. We then re-estimate 





for timely loss recognition and value relevance, but no significant evidence documented for 
earnings management model. Overall, the results generally support our findings. 
 
Finally, in our main analysis, a total of 42,808 firm-year observations was analysed, in which 
5,608 are from cross-listed sample. To address the selection bias that potentially confounds the 
effect of cross-listing on accounting quality as the treatment and control groups become 
dissimilar, we perform the propensity score matching.13 This procedure matches observations 
from cross-listed sample (treatment group) with the control group on several dimensions using 
the estimated likelihood of receiving treatment.14 The untabulated regression estimates on the 
reduced sample (11,216 firm-year observations), which consists of 5,608 firm-year 
observations of cross-listed firms and 5,608 firm-year observation from the control group, 
show qualitatively similar results to those reported earlier. We find evidence of differences in 
the timely loss recognition, earnings management and value relevance of book value of equity 
and earnings between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, hence showing that the resulting 
differences between the groups is theoretically the treatment effects - the effect of cross-listing 




Consistent with the importance of regulatory and legal environments in determining the quality 
of accounting data (Leuz et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2003), we posit that the accounting quality of 
firms that are cross-listed in the US is not only influenced by the stringent security laws, 
investor protection, litigation risk and disclosure requirement in the US but also influenced by 
the home country investor protection. In this study, we extend Lang et al. (2003) and Lang et 
al. (2006) by incorporating the role of investor protection in explaining the link between cross-
listing and accounting quality. We also add to the findings and suggestion of Lang et al. (2006) 
by comparing the accounting quality between firms cross-listed in the US and other domestic 
counterparts to provide a more relevant approach and give an accurate picture of the effects of 
cross-listing. 
                                                          
13 Shipman et al. (2017) argued that propensity score matching does not address most concerns relating to self-
selection or endogeneity, hence it is inaccurate to suggest that the procedure is an alternative to Heckman (1979) 
type selection models. 
14 When examining the treatment effect (the effect of cross-listing on accounting quality), the treatment sample 






Our study finds that cross-listed firms, as compared with non-cross-listed firms, show more 
timely recognition of losses particularly those domiciled in high investor protection countries, 
high anti-director rights index and common law legal system. In contrast, we find no evidence 
to link cross-listing with more timely reporting of losses in low investor protection countries, 
hence suggesting that the level of investor protection has influenced the cross-listing effects on 
earnings conservatism. Furthermore, we find similar result for earnings management measures, 
where cross-listed firms are associated with high earnings management practices, specifically 
earnings decreasing strategy. The results are robust in the full samples and subsamples 
analyses, except for the low anti-directors rights sample where we find evidence of earnings 
management but no evidence specifying the direction of earnings management. Finally, our 
analyses show that cross-listing has positive impact on the value relevance of book value of 
equity and earnings, and that the impact is more pronounced in low investor protection 
countries, compared to high investor protection countries. The results imply that the decision 
to cross-list would substantially enhance the quality of accounting information in a low investor 
protection environment since the gap in security laws and investor protections between the US 
and high investor protection countries is minimal, compared to a low investor protection 
environment where the gap is greater. In summary, our results show cross-listing is associated 
with enhanced accounting quality but the association is influenced by the extent of home 
country institutional factors.  
 
A public policy implication of our study is that listing in the US should be viewed as a new 
mobile governance by creating incentives for better disclosures and law enforcement in the 
home market through the renting of the superior corporate governance of the US. More 
transparent accounting and enhanced corporate governance mechanisms as well as stricter law 
in the home market serve as a partial substitute for the benefit of the US listing. Future research, 
however, could provide further evidence on the net benefits of cross-listings by evaluating 
whether the costs of cross-listing to US market significantly exceed its benefits, hence offering 
more salient inferences to the current debate through cross-country evidence. In addition, future 
studies could compare the accounting quality before and after cross-listing, and examine how 
investor protection and cross listing interaction affects accounting quality. A richer 





comparing sub-samples with different governance and financial characteristics. Another 
potentially fruitful area for future research is to examine the impact of Rule 12h-6’s passage 
on accounting quality since it was argued to have weakened the bonding benefits of the US 
market (Doidge et al., 2010). Further, refinement in terms of research methodology and 
analysis, especially relating to the variables, can be made by future researchers. Examples 
include adopting the incidence of qualified audit opinion to proxy for accounting quality. It 
would also be interesting to incorporate Gray’s (1998) Index of Conservatism, which is based 
on Hosftede’s dimensions of national culture, to proxy for country-level institutional 
environment. Finally, variables related to the quality of home country auditors may also be 
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Table 1 Definitions of variables  
Variable Description Data source 
CROSS A dummy variable that takes value one if the firm cross-list to US market, otherwise zero. 
The cross-list firms include Levels I, II and Level III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).  
Osiris BvD & the The 
Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation 
ANTIDIR Anti-director rights index based on La Porta et al.'s (1998) anti-director rights index revised 
by Djankov et al.’s (2008) 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
HIADRI A dummy variable that takes value one for the countries if the revised index (ANTIDIR) is 
four or higher, otherwise zero. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
COMLAW A dummy variable that takes value one for common law country, otherwise zero. La Porta al. (1998) 
PRICE The closing stock price at the fiscal year end  Osiris BvD 
BV The book value of common equity per share Osiris BvD 
E Earnings per share  Osiris BvD 
EY The earnings per share deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year Osiris BvD 
RET The annual stock return  Osiris BvD 
RD A dummy variable equals to one if RET is negative, otherwise zero. Osiris BvD 
ABSDACC The absolute value of residual generated from the modified Jones (1991) Osiris BvD 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets Osiris BvD 
LEV Total debts divided by total assets Osiris BvD 
AGE The natural logarithm of number of years since the year of incorporation Osiris BvD 
BIG4 A dummy variable that equals one if the firm appoints a Big Four auditor, zero otherwise. Osiris BvD 
FMGROW firm-specific growth, measured changes in sales compared to the previous year Osiris BvD 
INDGROW The mean of FMGROW calculated based on the Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry 
groups 
Osiris BvD 
CAPINT Capital intensity, equal to the ratio of net book value of property, plant and equipment to 
total assets 
Osiris BvD 
ININT Intangible intensity, equal to ratio of research and development expenditure to total sales Osiris BvD 
GDP The natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in US Dollar World Bank 
DISC DISC is a disclosure index as reported in La Porta et al. (2006)  
IFRS A dummy variable that takes value one if the financial statements are prepared using IFRS 
standards, otherwise zero. 
Osiris BvD 




Table 2 Sample selection. 
Total number of observations for 2007–2016  241,602 
Less: financial institutions (24,897) 
Less: firms in regulated industry (6,128) 
Less: observations from the US (29,612) 
Less: observations in country less than 100 observations (115) 
Less: observations in country with no data on cross-listing firms (62,617) 
Less: missing/incomplete data (75,425) 
  







Table 3 Descriptive statistics. 







 Mean Diff 
 
Mean SD  Mean SD  
PRICE 20.60 38.93  8.045 21.10  -12.552*** 
BV 9.568 16.17  6.509 15.01  -3.059*** 
E 0.770 2.246  0.417 1.615  -0.353*** 
EY 0.009 0.225  0.030 0.260  0.021*** 
RET 0.112 0.605  0.090 0.556  -0.023*** 
ABSDACC 0.028 0.032  0.026 0.024  -0.002*** 
SIZE 14.11 2.090  11.98 1.854  -2.130*** 
LEV 0.897 1.087  0.864 1.120  -0.033** 
MTB 2.805 5.031  1.696 3.403  -1.109*** 
BIG4 0.837 0.369  0.504 0.500  -0.333*** 
AGE 3.310 0.965  3.397 0.817  0.087*** 
FMGROW 0.342 9.436  0.208 12.45  -0.134 
INDGROW 2.183 1.923  1.854 2.075  -0.329*** 
CFO 0.083 0.144  0.059 0.244  -0.023*** 
CAPINT 0.292 0.236  0.285 0.211  -0.006** 





Panel B: Summary of country-level variables 
Country Obs Pct Cross Pct INVDUM ANTIDIR Legal System GDP DISC IFRS (%) OWN 
Argentina 109 0.25 19 0.34 Low 2.0 Civil Law 9.22 0.50 73.39 0.55 
Australia 1,907 4.45 589 10.5 High 4.0 Common Law 10.96 0.75 99.69 0.28 
Austria 167 0.39 20 0.36 Low 2.5 Civil Law 10.76 0.25 94.61 0.51 
Belgium 281 0.66 52 0.93 Low 3.0 Civil Law 10.69 0.42 93.59 0.62 
Brazil 269 0.63 4 0.07 High 5.0 Civil Law 9.39 0.25 99.63 0.63 
Canada 1,747 4.08 1,394 24.85 High 4.0 Common Law 10.8 0.92 80.94 0.24 
Denmark 364 0.85 86 1.53 High 4.0 Civil Law 10.95 0.58 95.33 0.40 
Finland 544 1.27 42 0.75 Low 3.5 Civil Law 10.75 0.50 98.90 0.34 
France 1,034 2.42 159 2.83 Low 3.5 Civil Law 10.64 0.75 84.91 0.24 
Germany 1,764 4.12 310 5.53 Low 3.5 Civil Law 10.64 0.42 88.61 0.50 
Greece 612 1.43 12 0.21 Low 2.0 Civil Law 10.15 0.33 93.79 0.68 
Hong Kong 595 1.39 128 2.28 High 5.0 Mixed System 10.41 0.92 99.83 0.54 
India 7,216 16.86 2 0.04 High 5.0 Common Law 7.18 0.92 0.60 0.43 
Indonesia 683 1.60 25 0.45 High 4.0 Civil Law 8.16 0.50 0.00 0.62 
Ireland 205 0.48 138 2.46 High 5.0 Common Law 10.82 0.67 64.88 0.36 
Israel 1,249 2.92 268 4.78 High 4.0 Mixed System 10.25 0.67 85.59 0.55 
Italy 360 0.84 55 0.98 Low 2.0 Civil Law 10.41 0.67 98.61 0.60 
Japan 10,439 24.39 531 9.47 High 4.5 Civil Law 10.71 0.75 1.18 0.13 
Malaysia 2,895 6.76 25 0.45 High 5.0 Mixed System 9.11 0.92 99.21 0.52 
Mexico 109 0.25 48 0.87 Low 3.0 Civil Law 9.21 0.58 96.33 0.67 
Netherlands 221 0.52 89 1.59 Low 2.5 Civil Law 10.76 0.50 87.78 0.31 
New Zealand 347 0.81 94 1.68 High 4.0 Common Law 10.42 0.67 99.42 0.51 
Norway 337 0.79 117 2.09 Low 3.5 Mixed System 11.45 0.58 100 0.31 
Philippines 467 1.09 68 1.21 High 4.0 Mixed System 7.68 0.83 100 0.51 
Portugal 193 0.45 14 0.25 Low 2.5 Civil Law 9.96 0.42 98.96 0.59 
Singapore 1,993 4.66 153 2.73 High 5.0 Common Law 10.72 1.00 99.3 0.53 
South Africa 613 1.43 68 1.21 High 5.0 Mixed System 8.89 0.83 0.00 0.52 
Spain 182 0.43 46 0.82 High 5.0 Civil Law 10.29 0.50 98.90 0.50 
Sweden 1,009 2.36 143 2.55 Low 3.5 Civil Law 10.87 0.58 91.58 0.28 
Switzerland 538 1.26 112 2 Low 3.0 Civil Law 11.19 0.67 72.68 0.48 
Thailand 1,570 3.67 13 0.23 High 4.0 Civil Law 8.56 0.92 64.52 0.48 
United Kingdom 2,789 6.52 784 13.98 High 5.0 Common Law 10.58 0.83 97.99 0.15 
Total 42,808 100 5,608 100        





Table 4 Regression results on timely loss recognition and cross-listing  
Variable/Sample Full Sample Low Investor Protection High Investor Protection Reduced Sample 
  HIADRI=0 COMLAW=0 HIADRI=1 COMLAW=1 Anti-Director 
Rights 
Legal System 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.177*** 0.219*** 0.182*** 0.038*** 0.037* 0.203*** 0.212*** 
 (6.952) (6.955) (8.560) (3.054) (1.894) (3.908) (4.117) 
RET 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.028*** 
 (17.018) (3.996) (14.996) (16.788) (10.264) (3.253) (2.587) 
RD 0.006 -0.008 -0.004 0.007 0.015* 0.027 0.017 
 (1.561) (-0.835) (-1.062) (1.602) (1.746) (1.490) (1.324) 
RET*RD 0.219*** 0.222*** 0.171*** 0.221*** 0.266*** 0.183*** 0.209*** 
 (21.144) (8.557) (15.006) (19.514) (13.793) (3.642) (5.701) 
CROSS 0.003 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.015   
 (0.476) (-0.418) (-1.046) (0.411) (1.218)   
RET*CROSS -0.028*** 0.021 -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.038***   
 (-3.560) (1.025) (-2.750) (-4.292) (-2.864)   
RD*CROSS 0.022** 0.019 0.016 0.023* 0.021   
 (2.149) (0.810) (1.362) (1.934) (1.127)   
RET*RD*CROSS 0.091*** -0.038 0.054 0.110*** 0.086**   
 (3.628) (-0.604) (1.609) (4.049) (2.101)   
HIADRI      -0.109*  
      (-1.957)  
RET*HIADRI      -0.030*  
      (-1.731)  
RD*HIADRI      0.002  
      (0.092)  
RET*RD*HIADRI      0.141***  
      (2.591)  
COMLAW       -0.091* 
       (-1.753) 
RET*COMLAW       -0.002 
       (-0.164) 
RD*COMLAW       0.018 
       (1.034) 
RET*RD*COMLAW       0.131*** 
       (3.001) 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.12 
Obs 42808 7278 26604 35530 16204 5608 5608 
F-stat 84.771 35.861 76.844 90.401 60.353 16.903 16.977 






Table 5 – Regression results on earnings management and cross-listing  
Variable/Sample Full Sample Low Investor Protection High Investor Protection Reduced Sample 
  HIADRI=0 COMLAW=0 HIADRI=1 COMLAW=1 Anti-Director 
Rights 
Legal System 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 
 (19.637) (15.790) (19.017) (38.122) (27.278) (8.986) (12.267) 
CROSS 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004***   
 (5.866) (2.021) (3.518) (6.278) (4.996)   
HIADRI      -0.007**  
      (-2.537)  
COMLAW       -0.022*** 
       (-2.994) 
AGE -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-8.142) (-7.045) (-2.630) (-4.824) (-8.674) (-4.720) (-4.720) 
BIG4 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (-4.698) (0.862) (-3.443) (-5.588) (-3.205) (-1.470) (-1.470) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-30.378) (-15.187) (-24.898) (-25.255) (-16.898) (-14.595) (-14.595) 
FMGROW 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.663) (0.884) (3.888) (2.523) (1.469) (0.124) (0.124) 
INDGROW 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.791) (3.630) (4.299) (4.753) (4.109) (2.827) (2.827) 
LEV 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (22.800) (9.179) (19.005) (19.866) (12.563) (5.188) (5.188) 
CFO -0.002*** 0.002** 0.000 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-3.019) (2.461) (0.547) (-10.569) (-6.468) (-0.238) (-0.238) 
CAPINT 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (22.518) (6.625) (17.057) (23.039) (14.221) (8.309) (8.309) 
ININT 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.485) (1.525) (2.331) (0.581) (0.304) (0.649) (0.649) 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13 
Obs 42808 7278 26604 35530 16204 5608 5608 
F-stat 70.934 21.771 42.537 84.544 60.653 17.468 17.468 





Table 6 Regression results on value relevance and cross-listing  
Variable/Sample Full Sample Low Investor Protection High Investor Protection Reduced Sample 
  HIADRI=0 COMLAW=0 HIADRI=1 COMLAW=1 Anti-Director 
Rights 
Legal System 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.736 0.941 1.168 1.787*** 1.750*** -1.674 -1.179 
 (0.531) (0.299) (0.691) (3.972) (3.205) (-0.307) (-0.217) 
BV 0.743*** 0.841*** 0.763*** 0.626*** 0.550*** 1.118*** 1.090*** 
 (118.562) (52.233) (100.801) (99.906) (37.434) (33.670) (38.769) 
E 3.597*** 3.747*** 3.567*** 3.009*** 4.139*** 7.032*** 7.444*** 
 (66.069) (28.383) (54.626) (50.618) (30.885) (32.074) (37.836) 
CROSS 2.231*** 3.478*** 2.037*** 1.655*** 2.325***   
 (8.707) (3.391) (4.902) (8.392) (9.646)   
BV*CROSS 0.385*** 0.293*** 0.336*** 0.493*** 0.535***   
 (27.271) (7.673) (17.194) (35.462) (24.207)   
E*CROSS 2.964*** 3.285*** 3.834*** 3.057*** 0.674***   
 (27.738) (12.067) (26.008) (28.086) (3.977)   
HIADRI      11.216*  
      (1.916)  
BV* HIADRI      -0.023  
      (-0.489)  
E* HIADRI      -0.947***  
      (-2.992)  
COMLAW       2.638 
       (0.484) 
BV*COMLAW       -0.039 
       (-0.757) 
E*COMLAW       -2.580*** 
       (-7.820) 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.66 0.67 
Obs 42808 7278 26604 35530 16204 5608 5608 
F-stat 2248.607 650.349 1756.980 1945.019 971.749 253.760 257.903 




Table 7 Regression results using Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure  
First Stage  Second Stage 
Probit Timely Loss Recognition  Earnings Management  Value Relevance 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept 11.440*** Intercept 0.241*** Intercept 0.100*** Intercept -2.846 
 (31.601)  (3.608)  (10.088)  (-0.403) 
GDP -1.399*** RET 0.051*** HIADRI -0.022** BV 1.118*** 
 (-42.243)  (3.255)  (-2.322)  (33.662) 
DISC 7.477*** RD 0.027 AGE -0.002*** E 12.351* 
 (72.182)  (1.471)  (-4.709)  (1.693) 
IFRS -0.807*** RET*RD 0.181*** BIG4 -0.002 HIADRI -0.023 
 (-26.419)  (3.597)  (-1.458)  (-0.497) 
OWN -1.158*** HIADRI -0.145** SIZE -0.004*** BV* HIADRI 7.035*** 
 (-11.072)  (-2.111)  (-14.600)  (32.030) 
  RET*HIADRI -0.030* FMGROW 0.000 E* HIADRI -0.949*** 
   (-1.738)  (0.124)  (-2.998) 
  RD*HIADRI 0.002 INDGROW 0.001*** IMR -0.641 
   (0.100)  (2.839)  (-0.261) 
  RET*RD*HIADRI 0.143*** LEV 0.002***   
   (2.628)  (5.196)   
  IMR 0.021 CFO -0.001   
   (0.896)  (-0.238)   
    CAPINT 0.016***   
     (8.316)   
    ININT 0.000   
     (0.649)   
    IMR 0.002   
     (0.468)   
  Country Effects Yes Country Effects Yes Country Effects Yes 
  Year Effects Yes Year Effects Yes Year Effects Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.6269 Adj.R2 0.12 Adj.R2 0.13 Adj.R2 0.66 
Obs 42808 Obs 5608 Obs 5608 Obs 5608 
LR chi2 24469.27 F-stat 16.560 F-stat 17.120 F-stat 248.081 
*, ** and *** represent significance at p<0.10, <0.05 and <0.01, respectively. t-values are reported in the parentheses. IMR is the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution function. See Table 
1 for the variable definitions. 
 
